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cleanup
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This change was made in order to allow things produced with Odin and using Odin's core library, to not require the LICENSE to also be distributed alongside the binary form.
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This fixes some vulnerabilities in the resolver that make spoofing DNS
queries somewhat trivial due to the code failing to randomize xid, as
well as match the reply xid with the query, and the origin of the packet:
- xid of the query was fixed at zero
- xid from the reply was never checked
- source address of the reply was never checked
This means anyone can flood the host with a fake reply with xid 0,
guessing the source port is trivial as it's less than 16bits (2^16 -
1024), which would cause odin to resolve a hostname to whatever an
attacker wanted.
While here also plug in two memory leaks.
Since this is CVE material, I've contacted @kelimion before hand which
instructed to put it in a PR.
There are also more bugs as the code conflates answer section,
authority section and aditional section into one, while in reality
only the anwer section should be taken into consideration.
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Cleanup allocated dns runtime data
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While harmless, the runtime should clean up non-user allocated data.
On the same veign of: https://github.com/odin-lang/Odin/pull/4680
I'm kinda new to Odin and wrote netcat, in order to get a clean valgrind run,
one has to manually destroy dns_configuration:
https://github.com/haesbaert/learn-odin/blob/main/netcat/netcat.odin#L168-L169
While here unexport the destroy procedure and make destruction idempotent.
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- A compression pointer is when the two higher bits are set, the code was
considering only 0xC0 as a pointer, where in reality anything from 0xC0-0xFF is
a pointer, probably went unnoticed since you need big packets to have long pointers.
- Make sure we can access the lower byte of the pointer by checking len, the
code was careful to not access past the first byte, but ignored the second.
- As per RFC9267 make sure a pointer only points backwards, this one is not so
bad, as the code had a iteration_max that ended up guarding against infinite jumps.
Lightly tested, some eyes are welcome, but these are remote DOSable.
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file tag syntax.
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Just selecting the same codepath as other BSD's for the most part.
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